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Introduction 
 
Critics of  legislation requiring employers to provide paid sick days frequently argue 
that these measures will lead to job loss and raise the national unemployment rate.1 
In previous work, we have analyzed whether there is any relationship between 
whether a country offers paid sick leave and national unemployment rates. Using 
data on over 100 countries around the world, we found no relationship between 
the availability of  paid sick leave and either unemployment or competitiveness.2   
 
However, the question remained whether the duration of  sick leave was critical to 
the impact on unemployment. The recent completion of  a detailed analysis of  
leave duration and funding mechanisms in 22 affluent countries now makes such 
an analysis possible. In this issue brief, we use internationally comparable data to 
examine the relationship between the national unemployment rate and the length 
of  government-mandated or government-funded short-term paid sick days and 
longer-term paid sick leave.3 We find no statistically significant effect of  mandated 
paid sick days or leave on national unemployment rates. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
To measure the effects of paid sick days and paid sick leave on national 
unemployment rates, we use data on the generosity of government-mandated and 
government-funded paid sick days and leave policy from a separate analysis we 
completed recently.4 In that analysis, we examined legally required forms of paid 
sick days and leave in a sample of 22 countries with the highest scores on the 
United Nation’s Human Development Index. 5  We assessed generosity by 
converting legal rights to paid sick days and leave into full-time-equivalent sick pay 
available to workers facing two typical health situations: a five-work-day flu and a 
fifty-work-day treatment for a more serious disease such as cancer. 
 
*John Schmitt is a Senior Economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Hye Jin Rho is a Research Assistant at the 
Center for Economic and Policy Research. Alison Earle is Co-Director of  the Project on Global Working Families at Harvard 
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To look for a relationship between the unemployment rate and paid sick days and leave, we regress 
internationally comparable data on unemployment rates from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD)6 against the separate measures of  the generosity of  paid sick days and paid 
sick leave.  
 
To smooth out short-run effects of  the business cycle, we use the average unemployment rate in each 
country over two periods: 2000-2007, which corresponds to the most recent complete business cycle in the 
United States, and 1989-2007, which includes the last two complete business cycles in the United States.7  
 
Ideally, we would also like to control for other factors that affect national unemployment rates. 
Unfortunately, there is not sufficient comparative data of  adequate quality available to include these factors 
in this study. We interpret the evidence here as simply a first-cut evaluation of  the claim that paid sick days 
and leave increase national unemployment rates.  
 
We also note that government-mandated or government-funded paid sick days and leave may be positively 
correlated across countries and over time with other forms of  labor-market regulation that are often 
hypothesized to increase unemployment (such as generous unemployment-related benefits, high levels of  
unionization, or high tax rates). To the extent that these other factors do act to increase the national 
unemployment rate, excluding them from this analysis would bias our simple regressions toward 
concluding that more generous paid sick days policies were associated with higher national unemployment 
rates. 
 
Unemployment and Leave 
  
Table 1 presents our main results. The first set of  columns shows the relationship between the generosity 
of  short-term paid sick days legislation and the national unemployment rate. For the period 2000-2007, 
national unemployment declines with the generosity of  paid sick days. Each additional day of  full-time-
equivalent paid sick days available to workers is associated with about a 0.2 percentage-point reduction in 
the national unemployment rate. The standard error of  this estimate is large, however, indicating that the 
relationship is not statistically significant. If  we expand the analysis to cover the average national 
unemployment rate for 1989-2007, the economic effect of  the generosity of  paid sick days on the 
unemployment rate almost doubles: an increase of  one paid sick day is associated with about a 0.4 
percentage-point fall in the national unemployment rate. But, again, the standard error of  the estimate is 
large, and the relationship is not statistically significant. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Relationship between Paid Sick Days and Harmonized Unemployment, 22 High Human Development Index 
Countries 
 
Paid Sick Days Paid Sick Leave 
National Unemployment Rate  Coefficient Std. Error R2  Coefficient Std. Error R2  
1989-2007 -0.210 0.245 0.036 NS 0.032 0.035 0.041 NS 
2000-2007 -0.401 0.275 0.096 NS 0.006 0.041 0.001 NS 
Note: Coefficients are results from Ordinary Least Squares Regression of the harmonized unemployment rate from the 
OECD (2009) against measures of the generosity of paid sick days (first set of columns) and paid sick leave (second set of 
columns) from Heymann, Rho, Schmitt, and Earle (2009).  Sample size is 22 in all cases.  NS: Not statistically significant. 
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Figure 1 shows the data and the fitted regression line for the average unemployment rate for 1989-2007 
and short-term paid sick days. The figure illustrates that countries with generous paid sick days policies –
those guaranteeing that a worker who misses five work days due to illness will receive five full days of  pay 
– have a wide range of  unemployment rates: from around three percent, for example, in the case of  
Switzerland, to about 10 percent in the case of  Finland. Similarly, countries that provide little or no paid 
sick days also exhibit a wide range of  unemployment rates: from under four percent in Japan to over 13 
percent in Spain. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Unemployment Rate (1989-2007) and Paid Sick Days 
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Source: Analysis of OECD and Heymann, Rho, Schmitt, and Earle 
 
 
The second set of  columns of  Table 1 presents results from a similar analysis of  the relationship between 
longer-term paid sick leave and the national unemployment rate. For both periods – 2000-2007 and 1989-
2007 – the national unemployment rate does not vary much with the availability of  paid sick leave, and in 
both cases the weak relationship is not statistically significant. Figure 2 shows the underlying data and the 
fitted regression line for the relationship between paid sick leave and the average unemployment rate over 
the period 1989-2007. 
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FIGURE 2 
Unemployment Rate (1989-2007) and Paid Sick Leave 
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Source: Analysis of OECD and Heymann, Rho, Schmitt, and Earle 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The experience of  the 22 countries with the highest level of  social and economic development (as 
measured by the Human Development Index) suggests that there is no significant relationship between 
national unemployment rates and legally-mandated access to paid sick days and leave. 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the National Small Business Association: “NSBA is opposed to legislation that would hinder an 
entrepreneur’s ability to create jobs—something the Healthy Families Act would surely do.” 
(http://www.nsba.biz/content/2343.shtml, accessed June 3, 2009.); or, the National Association of  Manufacturers: “Employer 
mandates [such as the Healthy Families Act] make it even more difficult for manufacturers to preserve or create jobs and help 
drive economic recovery.” (http://www.nam.org/NewsFromtheNAM.aspx?DID={EE3B9173-EAC9-4E4A-81F3-
E2F82861D352}, accessed June 3, 2009.) 
2 Earle, Alison and S.Jody. Heymann. 2006. “A Comparative Analysis of  Paid Leave for the Health Needs of  Workers and their 
Families Around the World.” Journal of  Comparative Policy Analysis. 2006; 8 (3): 241-257. 
3 Following Heymann, Rho, Schmitt, and Earle (2009, p. 2) and others: “We use the term ‘paid sick days’ to refer to short-term 
leave for health-care appointments, to deal with short-term illnesses and injuries, and to address periodic short-term health 
needs related to chronic health conditions. The term ‘paid sick leave’ is used to refer to longer-term medical leave such as that 
needed for serious health conditions that require lengthier treatment and recovery periods. We use the term ‘paid sick days and 
leave’ to refer to both of  these policies together. In many countries, paid sick days are covered by employer mandate and paid 
sick leave by social insurance.” 
4 See S. Jody Heymann, Hye Jin Rho, John Schmitt, and Alison Earle. 2009. “Contagion Nation: A Comparison of  Paid Sick 
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Day Policies in 22 Countries,” Center for Economic and Policy Research Briefing Paper (May). 
5 Again, following Heymann et al (2009, p. 4): “Our sample consists of  those countries that score at least 0.94 on the Human 
Development Index (HDI), ‘a summary composite index that measures a country’s average achievements in three basic aspects 
of  human development: health, knowledge, and a decent standard of  living. Health is measured by life expectancy at birth; 
knowledge is measured by a combination of  the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross    
enrollment ratio; and standard of  living by GDP per capita (PPP US$)’ 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/faq/question,68,en.html). The Human Development Index (HDI) is calculated yearly by 
the United Nations for 177 countries and areas with sufficient data and reported in their annual Human Development 
Reports. See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, Human Development Indices - A statistical 
update 2008, Table 1).” 
6 OECD, Main Economic Indicators database, accessed May 29, 2009. Data for Iceland refer to the “commonly used 
definition” and are not strictly comparable to the harmonized or standardized rates used for the rest of  the sample. 
7 Business cycles in the rest of  the sample follow roughly the same pattern, and our qualitative results are not sensitive to 
choosing any multi-year period through 2007 that starts between 1989 and 2000. We exclude data for 2008 because they 
correspond to a new, incomplete business cycle. Including the most recent data available makes the coefficient on the paid sick 
days and leave regressions more negative, reinforcing the conclusions we draw from Table 1. 
